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INTEGRITY IN GOVERNMENT
GOVERNMENTAL AND ACADEMIC
INTEGRITY AT HOME AND ABROAD
Sara Sun Beale*
INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to join the many people who have saluted Dean
Feerick's career and the values that it reflects.
When I first agreed to attend this conference, I planned to talk
about federal criminal law enforcement. But I learned that
Commissioner Hearn and Mr. Fiske would be participating, and I
knew they could speak authoritatively about the practice of
investigating and prosecuting corruption. Accordingly, I will address
the broader themes of the symposium rather than focusing exclusively
on prosecution as a means to curb corruption.
I want to use this essay to discuss two ideas. First, I want to
describe some recent research on integrity in the academic area and
suggest that it has implications for integrity in other contexts,
including government integrity. Second, I want to describe some
international developments in the 1990s, particularly the founding and
rapid rise of the NGO Transparency International and the explosion
of international activity concerned with corruption.
While I was preparing for this conference, I had a conversation with
one of our graduate students from Mexico. He shared with me a
paper on corruption and he quoted a popular Mexican phrase that he
translated as "he who does not cheat does not progress. '
There are places where there is no expectation of integrity, and no
sense that corruption and lack of integrity are exceptional. Rather, in
those places-and maybe plumbing in New York might have been one
* Professor Sara Sun Beale is Charles L.B. Lowndes Professor of Law at Duke
University School of Law. Professor Beale's scholarship has focused principally on
the federal government's role in the criminal justice system. She has written on topics
such as prosecuting government corruption, hate crimes, gun offenses, and, most
recently, how the media and politics influence public opinion and criminal justice
policy.
1. Alejandro Posadas, Corruption: Its Treatment Under International Law
(2003) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Duke University School of Law) (on file with the
Law Library, Duke University School of Law).
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of those areas2-- the expectation and norms are that you need to cheat
in order to progress, in order to stay even with your competition.
Those examples raise the issues that I'd like to focus on, particularly
in connection with academic integrity.
I. INTEGRITY IN ACADEMIA
A. An Overview of Research Findings
What do we know about the extent of cheating and corruption on
college campuses and in high schools? The available research paints
an alarming picture.
Recent national studies of both high school and college students
have found that approximately seventy-five percent admit to some
significant cheating. Moreover, the surveys show that the rates of self-
reported cheating have been increasing significantly for at least a
decade. I don't know how far that trend goes back because the
surveys that I have found before that period aren't fully comparable.
Donald McCabe's research, reported by the Center for Academic
Integrity (now located at Duke University), found that in 2000-2001,
seventy-four percent of high school students admitted to serious
cheating on tests, seventy-two percent admitted to serious cheating at
least once in the year on written work, and more than thirty percent
said that they engaged in serious repetitive cheating on tests and
exams.
3
I think we can have some confidence that those numbers are pretty
reliable because, during the same period, the Josephson Institute of
Ethics did a national study of 12,000 students, and they compared the
results to earlier surveys, beginning in 1992. In 1992, sixty-one
percent of the students admitted cheating at least once during the past
year on an exam. By 2002, the number was up to seventy-four
percent.4
The Josephson studies are interesting because they point to other
aspects of integrity, too. In 1992, thirty-three percent of the students
2 See Rose Gill Hearn, Integrity and the Department of Investigation, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 415, 419 (2003).
3. The survey is summarized on the Center for Academic Integrity's web site,
http://www.academicintegrity.org/cai-research.asp. (last visited Sept. 24, 2003). It is
also discussed in Donald McCabe, Cheating: Why Students Do It and How We Can
Help Them Stop, Am. Educator, Winter 2001, at 38, available at
http://www.aft.org/american-educator/winter200l/Cheating.html. (last visited Sept.
24, 2003). An overview of the research findings is also available at
http://ethics.acusd.edu/video/cai/2001/McCabe/indexfiles/frame.html, under the
subheading "Cheating Is Widespread" (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
4. The survey findings are summarized on the Josephson Institute's web site,
which also contains a link to all of the data. See
http://www.josephsoninstitute.org/Survey2002/survey2002-pressrelease.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2003).
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admitted that they had stolen something from a store. It's usually
shoplifting. It could be something else, but I think that's what that
figure captures. By 2002, it was up to thirty-eight percent.
There were also increases in the number that admitted lying to their
parents, lying to their teachers, and stealing from their parents.
A very interesting question debuted on the Josephson survey in
2000, so we only have more recent data. In 2000, thirty-four percent
of students agreed with the statement "a person has to lie or cheat
sometimes to succeed." By 2002, forty-three percent agreed with that
statement. It went up nine percent just in those two years.
The large number of young people in the United States who admit
to cheating and say that you have to be dishonest to succeed is
alarming. There is, however, also some good news that bears on the
kind of question that the panel was asked to think about, which is how
you create and sustain integrity.
There is mounting evidence that campus environments and cultures
have a very significant effect on levels of cheating, and that students in
the United States are very much affected by the operational values
and norms that they find on their campuses.5
To judge the institutional environment and culture, it's important to
look at a series of questions like the following (and it has to be a
whole range of such questions, not just one): Is academic honesty
discussed early and often at orientation and at other points? Do
instructors address it? Are students required to sign an honor code
and honor statements on each exam? Does the school punish
cheating harshly if it is detected? Does the school seem really
concerned and committed to the discovery of academic dishonesty?
There are findings that cheating is reduced by about one-third to
one-half on campuses with a serious honor code.6 I think that would
be contrasted to what Mary Daly said they found in terms of a nice
printed honor code or a printed mission integrity statement at Enron
that was in someone's drawer somewhere and never utilized,
enforced, or spoken about.7
What is the current institutional culture? In the McCabe findings
from 2002, forty-seven percent of the high school students in that
survey said their teachers sometimes or always ignored cheating.8
And then the students speculated on why-for example, that it was
5. See Mary C. Daly, Teaching Integrity in the Professional Responsibility
Curriculum: A Modest.Proposal for Change, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 261, 270-74 (2003);
David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 279, 294-98 (2003);
Burnele V. Powell, The Limits of Integrity or Why Cabinets Have Locks, 72 Fordham
L. Rev. 311, 326-28 (2003); Deborah L. Rhode, If Integrity Is the Answer, What Is the
Question?, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 333,334-35 (2003).
6. See McCabe, supra note 3, for a summary of the survey data.
7. See Daly, supra note 5, at 271.
8. See McCabe, supra note 3, at 40.
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too much trouble for the teachers to deal with the problem or that the
teachers did not want to take the time, and so forth. So about half of
the students were reporting they thought that academic dishonesty
wasn't treated as truly important.
The research on academic integrity suggests that you can basically
divide students into three groups:
o One group of students are very law-abiding and aren't much
affected by their institutional culture. They will fastidiously follow all
the rules.
* Another group is intent upon pursuing loopholes, and where the
loopholes aren't big enough, they just kind of evade the rules.
o The largest group is in the middle, and that group is greatly
affected by the institutional culture. There are many, many parallels
that you could think of in terms of how the enforcement and the
cultural endorsement of rules really affect the behavior of most
people who are in the middle.
B. Implications for Integrity in Other Contexts
Consider the example of speed limits and traffic activity. There are
many places where the speed limits aren't really enforced or regarded
as important, and most people will exceed the posted speed limits
there. There are, however, always a few people in the right-hand lane
who are just going the speed limit, regardless. In contrast, where the
speed limit is treated as important and rigorously enforced, almost
everybody obeys it, though you will probably still find a few idiots
speeding and zooming in and out around everyone else. But most
people recognize that there is a kind of culture in different localities,
and they conform to it. They will speed when that's the culture, and
abide by the speed limits when that's the culture.
We see the same thing with tax compliance. Different countries
have different rates of tax compliance. Again, there are some people
who will always cheat no matter what kind of a tax regime they are in,
and some who will never cheat. But what we find if we look
comparatively is that very many people are influenced by whether
compliance is regarded as a very important norm, whether there is
enforcement, and so forth.
This issue certainly harkens back to the first panel's emphasis on
the importance of structures, the importance of incentives.9 But it
also suggests some other concepts that perhaps were implied in those
panelists' discussions, or perhaps need to be introduced at this point.
One is social influence," which is a term that social psychologists
9. See generally Daly, supra note 5; Luban, supra note 5; Powell, supra note 5;
Rhode, supra note 5.
10. For a general discussion of social influence, see Dan M. Kahan, Social
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349 (1997).
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use to describe the propensity of individuals to conform to the
behavior and expectations of others. This phenomenon is quite
pervasive in social, economic, and political life, and there are many
familiar examples.
Many moviegoers want to see whatever is the most popular movie
of the day, and they will stand in line and wait to see it. Teenage girls,
it has been found, are more likely to get pregnant when they see other
teenage girls having babies. Citizens, it has been found, are more
likely to vote for candidates when they learn that others support those
candidates.
Social influence is a term that psychologists use to describe this
propensity to conform our behavior to the behavior and the
expectations of the others around us. In that sense, I think, it takes us
back to the first panel's emphasis on the point that context counts a
lot in whether people behave in a way that is consistent with the idea
of integrity."
From the point of view of criminal law, the concept of social
influence emphasizes that policymakers should focus not only on
individual behavioral incentives (such as increasing criminal
sentences, which has been such an important theme in recent years in
criminal justice policy) but also on the public's perception of the
extent of corruption, cheating, and criminality. The perception that
such behaviors are rampant encourages corrupt behavior on the part
of individuals who would otherwise behave properly. So, in addition
to reducing the actual incidence of corruption, it is also important to
reduce the perception that such behavior is common.
I would also like to draw attention to the idea of social meaning,12
which refers to the interpretation people place on information about
individual or community values. Individuals interpret both individual
and institutional behavior against a background of social norms that
tell them how people with certain values should behave. Adding
social meaning, then, enriches our understanding of why people obey
or break the law.
At the conference one of the participants raised the issue of the role
of investigative reporting as a deterrent to official misconduct. Since
the Watergate period, investigative reporting has become an
important feature of our national life. Viewed through the lens of
social influence and social meaning, investigative reporting may be a
double-edged sword.
On the one hand, if investigative reporting reveals misconduct and
brings about public rebukes and perhaps removal from office, those
marks of the social meaning of that conduct ought to be quite
significant and ought to work as a deterrent. On the other hand, we
11. See supra note 5.
12. For a general discussion of social meaning see Kahan, supra note 10.
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may have gone so far with "gotcha!" journalism that it may be
undermining efforts to promote integrity. So much misconduct has
now been exposed in so many situations that the public has become
very jaundiced and jaded. This contributes to the public having a
lower expectation of the level of behavior of public officials, and it
may also make it more difficult to persuade ethical people to
undertake public responsibilities and public office.
Getting back to the lessons we can learn from the research on
integrity in academia, we can see in the concept of academic
integrity-which would carry over as well to governmental
integrity--that the social meaning placed on whether people follow
the rules varies significantly from institution to institution. Within an
academic institution that has various rules about behavior on
examinations, behavior on written projects (whether it's plagiarism or
consultation with others), how seriously those rules are taken would
be reflected not only in the sanctions that are applied but in the
structures that are set up and in the way that individuals in positions
of authority treat those topics. For example, the Air Force Academy
reportedly dismisses students whose only offense is failing to report
cheating by someone else. So we do have some models of institutions
that treat the failure to report misconduct as just as big a violation as
the actual misconduct.
To sum up, we know that cheating or corruption can bring about
more cheating and corruption through the effect of social influence
and through a shift in social meaning. The parallels are clear: If we
think that "everybody does it," almost everybody will do it.
II. POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND INTEGRITY IN THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT
An interesting study compared members of the U.S. Congress to
legislators in Germany and members of Parliament in the U.K.13 It
concludes that the U.S. has had what it called the "hyper-
responsiveness" of politicians to the electorate. 4 Legislators in the
United States spend more time than their European counterparts
trying to figure out what their constituents want and how to get
reelected, and less time on the substance of the provisions being
debated. 5
This raises an intriguing question. Assume that the balance
between campaigning and lawmaking varies. This study, for example,
found quite a significant difference between the amount of time
13. See Anthony Stephen King, Running Scared: Why America's Politicians
Campaign Too Much and Govern Too Little 1-28 (1997).
14. Id. at 107 (quoting Alan Ehrenhalt, The United States of Ambition:
Politicians, Power, and the Pursuit of Office 246 (1991)).
15. See King, supra note 13.
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allocated by legislators in Germany and the U.K. towards thinking
about the substance of the provisions-whether it be abortion or
whatever else-as opposed to soliciting money from constituents,
going out and giving talks, meeting with interest groups, and so forth.
Assuming, then, that the balance between the two kinds of activities
varies in different countries, the question would be what produces the
situation we now have in the U.S.? After all, they have media in other
countries.
One possibility is that the periods of time in which elections are
held in a parliamentary system might play a role in determining how
much each person feels at risk of not being reelected. Of course other
factors may be even more important. Comparative studies may help
isolate factors that make it more or less likely that individual
candidates or individual government officials will behave in a way that
demonstrates integrity, whether it's legislative, judicial, or otherwise.
Research on the behavior of elected judges may also bear on these
issues. For example, some research has found changes in judicial
behavior in death penalty and other kinds of cases in the year before
the judges' reelection campaigns, indicating that if you just chart out
their decisions, they appear to be different in that year before the
election.16
My point is that there are structures that may make it more or less
likely that people will behave in ways that we would define as having
integrity.
16. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is
Justice Blind When It Runs For Office?, Am. J. Pol. Sci. (forthcoming, on file with
Fordham Law Review) (finding sentence imposed by Pennsylvania judges with
election imminent to be three to four and a half months longer than those of judges
recently elected or retained, and finding judges are about 20-30% more punitive in
sentencing in the period before they stand for retention); Melinda Gann Hall, Justices
as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in America, 23 Am. Pol. Q. 485,
495-97 (1995) (finding state court judges more likely to uphold death sentences in the
last two years of their term); cf. Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic
Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. Pol. 427, 442 (1992) (finding liberal state judges
in states with short terms less likely to dissent from decisions upholding the death
penalty). Also, a significant and direct relationship has been shown between the
amount of direct political pressure placed on judges in a given state and that state's
relative rate of serious error in cases where capital punishment was imposed. See
James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System Part II: Why Is There So Much Error in
Capital Cases and What Can Be Done About It, at v-vi, 170, 187-88, 354-55, 412-13,
available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/ (last visited Sept. 24,
2003); see also id. at 412 & n.935 and text cited therein (finding a similar relationship
between direct political pressure on state appellate judges and the rate at which those
judges affirm "seriously flawed death verdicts"). For a general discussion of the
effects of politics on judicial behavior in death penalty cases, see Stephen B. Bright &
Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of
Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 759 (1995).
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III. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1990S
My final topic is international developments relating to corruption
and integrity.17
I want to trace some developments that grew out of the Watergate
investigation, which is best known for bringing about the resignation
of President Richard Nixon. Less well known today is the fact that
the Watergate Investigation also delved into the role of U.S.
corporations in making campaign contributions to the 1972
presidential election. As the corporate side of the investigation
developed, it brought to light secret contributions by U.S.
corporations to foreign officials, such as $2.5 million from United
Brands to Honduran officials who were, it was hoped, going to repeal
the banana tax;18 and $3 million by Gulf Oil to the Republican
Democratic Party of South Korea, which may well have been decisive
in a close national election. 9
These revelations led to the adoption of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, which prohibits payments to foreign government
officials and political parties and candidates with the purpose of
influencing official action or securing improper advantages. 2' After
about fifteen years, the Act began to bear fruit on the international
stage, for several reasons.
First, there was pressure by U.S. corporations that did not want to
be in a disadvantageous position compared to their European and
other counterparts. They wanted an equal playing field. If they
couldn't pay bribes, they didn't want companies from other countries
to be able to pay bribes. Another important factor was the State
Department's endorsement and the Clinton Administration's
adoption of the notion that bribery of foreign government officials
was not only a trade issue, but also an issue of economic development
and democratic accountability.
In the 1990s, with heavy pressure from the Clinton Administration,
a series of similar provisions have been adopted. The Organization
17. For an excellent discussion of these international developments, see generally
Posadas, supra note 1.
18. See SEC v. United Brands Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 7251 (D.D.C. Jan.
27, 1976), 1976 WL 161366 (referencing a $2.5 million payment to Honduran
officials); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a
Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 Va. L.
Rev. 1099, 1116 (1977) (discussing a $1.25 million payment to the President of
Honduras to avoid export duty on bananas).
19. See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearing on
S. 381-6 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Multinat'l Corps., 94th Cong. 8-9 (1975)
(statement of B.R. Dorsey, Chairman of the Board, Gulf Oil Corporation)
(referencing a $1 million payment in 1966 and a $3 million payment in 1970).
20. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, dd-2, dd-3 (1998 & Supp. 2003)).
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for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"),2 1 the
Council of Europe ("CoE"),22 and the Organization of American
States ("OAS")23 have all adopted major anti-bribery treaties, and the
UN is working on an international convention.24 These treaties vary
in their scope and their enforcement mechanisms, and to some degree
they reflect the different kinds of organizations that have been
involved in founding them.
The OECD treaty reflects the fact that its member nations are
capital exporters interested exclusively in preventing the bribery of
foreign officials to level the playing field." In contrast, the OAS and
the Council of Europe view corruption in a broader context. The
OAS sees corruption as relevant to its agenda of democracy and
economic development in the Southern Hemisphere,26 and the CoE
focuses on the demand side as well as the supply side of bribery.27
The Council of Europe agreement has its origins in the Agreement
of Ministers of Justice from those European countries where
corruption threatens human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.28
This is very much related to social meaning, reflecting a different
understanding of the social meaning of corruption, a different
understanding of its importance, as well as an effort to use social
influence on member countries and then having that trickle down
through their enforcement mechanisms.
The Council of Europe has a holistic approach in its Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption, Twenty Guiding Principles to fight against
corruption, and a Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials.29 There
is an effort to focus on more than simply a "prosecute them after it
happens" agenda, as well as a different understanding of the values
that are threatened by corruption. And maybe in some senses it's like
what Professor Waldron spoke about: the underlying values,
recognizing those underlying values, and then being able to get a
broader buy-in from the constituency.3 °
Finally, I want to note the important role played by Transparency
21. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 19, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (entered into force
Feb. 15, 1999).
22. See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505
(entered into force Jan. 7, 2002).
23. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
724 (entered into force Mar. 6, 1997).
24. See Posadas, supra note 1, at 155-58.
25. See id. at 126.
26. See id. at 123.
27. See id. at 132.
28. See id. at 125.
29. See id. (explaining that these provisions seek to cover "not only criminal, but
also administrative and civil aspect[s] of the fight against corruption").
30. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Legislating With Integrity, 72 Fordham L. Rev.
373 (2003).
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International ("TI").3 In 1993, nine people had a meeting, and they
decided to form an entity and to try to do something about corruption.
Just ten years later, there are Transparency International chapters in
more than ninety countries. TI has promulgated two incredibly
interesting indexes: the Bribery Perception Index and the Corruption
Perception Index. These rank various countries, one versus another,
in how much perceived corruption there is, and they hold individual
countries up to public scrutiny. This exposure effectively requires
countries with poor rankings to explain why they can't do as well as
other nations. It also increases the outside pressures, for example, in
places like Mexico that I was speaking about in the context of my
graduate student's study.3 2
TI's rapid growth also reflects an interesting use of technology like
the Internet, which serves as a tool not only to mobilize people who
are unhappy about international trade policy, but also those who are
very unhappy about corruption. People are using the Internet to
distribute materials, to hold responsible previously relatively
unaccountable governments. Transparency International and these
international conventions are increasingly developing agendas that
can be imported into any country, so that local people can ask "why
can't we have this type of program?" This is an interesting and
important development.
CONCLUSION
It is a privilege to salute Dean John Feerick with these brief
comments exploring the connection between governmental and
academic integrity and describing international developments that
may promote integrity.
31. For information about Transparency International, see
http://www.transparency.org/.
32. See Posadas, supra note 1.
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